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CHANGES IN ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE-1950-1960:
C.P.A. §§21-71 AND RELATED SUPREME
COURT RULES
PRENTICE H. MARSHALL AND THOMAS P. SULLIVAN
ITHOUT DOUBT THE single significant development in Illinois
civil practice and procedure during the past ten years was
the adoption of the 1956 Civil Practice Act. As the 1933
Act represented twenty-six years experience under its forerunner-the
1907 Act-so, too, did the 1956 Act embody and codify the wisdom
gained from twenty-three years experience under the 1933 Act.
Comment will be made upon the changes brought about by the
act in six areas of practice and procedure: parties, pleading, piecemeal
appeals, discovery, jury practice, and post trial motions. Not every
change in these areas is noted. Space does not permit that. Remarks
have been limited to those changes which the authors deem to be the
most significant.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to their associates,
Messrs. Robert E. Pfaff and Holland C. Capper, members of the
Illinois Bar, for the assistance provided by them in the preparation
of this article.
PARTIES
As our social and economic structures have become more complex,
the concepts of parties to litigation have broadened. Society now
demands that the courts make themselves available to determine to-
day's complex multi-party controversies. These demands were satis-
fied by the "party" provisions of the 1956 Practice Act.
Third party proceedings. Prior to the passage of the 1956 Act, there
was no statutory authority for a defendant to join a third party de-
fendant, i.e., a party to whom the defendant would look for recovery
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
in the event the plaintiff prevailed in his suit against the defendant.
Only if the action involved a counterclaim was a limited third party
practice sanctioned.' Section 25 of the 1956 Civil Practice Act2 au-
thorizes a broad third party practice. A defendant may bring a third
party complaint against "a person not a party to the action who is
or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him." The original defendant can implead only a person who is liable
to him, and may not, by use of section 25, force the original plaintiff
to sue a third party whom he did not wish to sue. However, once the
third party defendant is before the court, the original plaintiff may
assert any claim against the third party defendant which he could
have asserted had the party been joined as a defendant originally.
Intervention. Statutory regulation of intervention was also provided
for for the first time by section 26.1 of the 1956 Act. Many of the
restrictions which arose from prior decisions8 were obviated. For ex-
ample, it is no longer necessary that the intervenor have a direct interest
in the suit.4 Section 26.1 provides for intervention as of right under
certain conditions,5 and for intervention in the discretion of the trial
court in other cases. The court may specify the terms under which
intervention will be granted, so that the original parties will not be
prejudiced or delayed in conducting the ligitation.6
Interpleader. Decisional limitations had discouraged attempts at in-
terpleader. For example, if all parties against whom relief was de-
manded did not claim the same thing, debt, or duty, or if all adverse
claims did not depend on or arise from a common source, or if the
plaintiff claimed any interest in the subject matter, or if the plaintiff
had incurred an independent liability to either or any of the claimants
1 See Johnson v. Moon, 3 Ill.2d 561, 121 N.E.2d 774 (1954).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 25 (1959). Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent refer-
ences to statutory sections in this article are to chapter 110 of the 1959 ILLINoIS REVISED
STATUTES.
3 See, e.g., Bernero v. Bernero, 363 Ill. 328, 2 N.E.2d 317 (1936) (direct interest in
subject matter necessary); Hairgrove v. City of Jacksonville, 366 111. 163, 8 N.E.2d 187
(1937) (intervenor has no control over issues).
4 Mensik v. Smith, 18 Ill.2d 572, 166 N.E.2d 265 (1960); but see Cooper v. Henrichs,
10 Ill.2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
5 Among the Illinois statutes which provide an unconditional right to intervene are
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 29 (1959) (attachment); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 119, § 22a (1959)
(replevin); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39s-9 (1959) (review of prevailing wage); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 46, § 23-25 (1959) (election contest).
6 Dowsett v. City of East Moline, 8 111.2d 560, 134 N.E.2d 793 (1956).
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-interpleader would not lie. Section 26.2 of the act now provides
that it is no objection that the several claims do not have a common
source or are not identical or are adverse to or independent of one
another. Neither is it now an objection that the plaintiff claims he
is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants.
Actions against joint debtors or partners. Section 27 of the former
Practice Act was completely rewritten to provide that all parties to
a joint obligation, including a partnerhip obligation, may be sued
jointly or severally. This revision eliminated the dichotomy that part-
nership obligations were joint and several in equitable actions but joint
only in actions at law. 8
Actions against partnerships. Section 27.1 of the 1956 Act provides
that partnerships may be sued in the firm name, or by bringing an
action against the partners in their names as individuals doing business
as a partnership. Thus, partnerships are treated as separate entities for
procedural purposes, much the same as corporations.
PLEADING
Equal in importance to modem concepts of "parties" are up-to-date
concepts of pleading. The 1933 Practice Act did much to destroy
old common-law pleading requirements in Illinois. Little remained to
be done in 1956.
Pleading and proof in the alternative. Section 43 (2) provides:
When a party is in doubt as to which of two or more statements of fact is
true, he may, regardless of consistency, state them in the alternative or hy-
pothetically in the same or different counts or defenses, whether legal or
equitable. A bad alternative does not affect a good one. (Emphasis added.)
The draftsmen of the 1956 Act stated in the Joint Committee Com-
ments that the words "regardless of consistency" were inserted in
order to make it clear "that alternative pleading of facts is sanctioned
in spite of inconsistencies, removing any doubt in that regard under
the present act." 9
In McCormick v. Kopmann,10 the Third District Appellate Court
7 Platte Valley State Bank v. National Live Stock Bank, 155 111. 250, 40 N.E. 621
(1895); Curran v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 348 Ill. App. 210, 108 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
8 See Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Estate of Sternberg, 10 Ill.2d 328, 140 N.E.2d 125
(1957). That case, construing pre-1956 law, held that S 15 of the Uniform Part-
nership Act, Ill. Laws 1917, at 625, did not change the rule in equity that all partner-
ship obligations are joint and several.
9 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 43 at 514 (1956).
10 23 111. App.2d 189, 161 N.E.2d 720 (1959).
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approved joinder of a count under the Wrongful Death Act in which
the plaintiff alleged that the deceased was exercising due care at the
time of his death, and a count under the Dram Shop Act in which
it was alleged that the deceased's intoxication proximately caused his
death. In the course of its opinion, the court said:
. . . Where. . . . the injured party is still living and able to recollect the
events surrounding the accident, pleading in the alternative may not be justi-
fied, but where, as in the case at bar, the key witness is deceased, pleading al-
ternative sets of facts is often the only feasible way to proceed.1'
The court went on to hold:
Alternative fact allegations made in good faith and based on genuine doubt
are not admissions against interest so as to be admissible in evidence against
the pleader.' 2
The court also held that the plaintiff had the right to go to the jury
on both counts even though her proof under the wrongful death count
contradicted and tended to rebut the proof she submitted under the
dram shop count, and vice versa. The court said:
The provisions of the Civil Practice Act authorizing alternative pleading,
necessarily contemplate that the pleader adduce proof in support of both sets
of allegations or legal theories, leaving to the jury the determination of the
facts. 13
Joinder of causes of action. The 1956 Act continued in effect the
provision of section 44(1) that a plaintiff may join any causes of
action against any defendant, and the defendant may set up any claims
whatever against the plaintiff. The legislature added the following
provision:
If a cause of action is one heretofore cognizable only after another cause of
action has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two causes of action may bejoined; but the court shall grant relief only in accordance with the relative
substantive rights of the parties.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that this provision authorizes
the joining of a bill in equity seeking specific performance of a con-
tract to purchase a leasehold interest in real estate, and a separate
count for relief in the nature of a creditor's bill to discover assets. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the First District Appellate Court's hold-
11 Id. at 201-02, 161 N.E.2d at 728.
12 Id. at 203, 161 N.E.2d at 729.
1.1 Id. at 205, 161 N.E.2d at 730.
14 Young v. Wilkinson, 18 II.2d 428, 164 N.E.2d 39 (1960).
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ing 5 that section 49 of the Chancery Act"6 precludes creditor's bills
until a judgment has been entered and execution has been returned
unsatisfied.
Amendments. In Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn,17 the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff sued the agent of the proper defendant, but did not dis-
cover his mistake until after the statute of limitations had run. Sub-
section (4) of section 46 sets up five requirements, compliance with
which will avoid the consequences of the Pitcairn rule: The plaintiff
must (1) commence suit within the statute of limitations; (2) inad-
vertently fail to join the proper defendant; and (3) actually serve
the right defendant, his agent or partner, although in the wrong ca-
pacity; (4) the correct defendant must know of the original action
and that it involved him; and (5) the amended complaint must state
a cause of action which arises under the same transaction set up in
the original pleading. If these conditions are met, the plaintiff may
amend his complaint, after the statute of limitations has run, to include
the proper defendant.
Section 46 (4) was held to be exclusive in Fahey v. Production Steel
Co.,' where a plaintiff who admittedly did not comply with all its
requirements was held to be barred from amending her complaint after
the statute of limitations had run, to include a corporate defendant
whose servant had injured the plaintiff within the scope of his employ-
ment. Compare Lau v. West Towns Bus Co.,'0 in which the Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the amendment of
a complaint to include a company which assumed the liabilities and
took over the assets of a reorganization trustee in bankruptcy, where
the suit against the trustee was commenced in time.
Judgment on the pleadings. Section 45 of the 1956 Act gives statu-
tory recognition to motions for judgment on the pleadings, although
the courts had entertained and sanctioned such motions prior to the
enactment.20
15 Young v. Wilkinson, 22 Ill. App.2d 304, 160 N.E.2d 709 (1959).
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, S 49 (1959).
17 371 Il. 203, 20 N.E.2d 280 (1939).
18 16 11. App.2d 312, 148 N.E.2d 6 (1958).
19 16 Ill.2d 442, 158 N.E.2d 63 (1959).
20 See Milanko v. Jensen, 404 Ill. 261, 88 N.E.2d 857 (1949) (plaintiff's motion
granted); Harrison v. Kamp, 395 111. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946) (defendants-cross plain-
tiffs' motion granted); Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 (1947)
(defendant's motion granted).
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There has been some confusion between motions for judgment on
the pleadings and for summary judgment. In Tompkins v. France,2
plaintiff's motion was entitled, "summary motion for judgment on
the pleadings." Defendant contended that this was a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Notwithstanding the designation, the Appellate
Court held it was a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that
it had been properly granted because there was no issue of fact to be
tried and plaintiff was entitled to judgment under the averments and
admissions made by the pleadings.
Motions for summary judgments and decrees. Section 57 of the
1956 Act contains summary judgment provisions substantially iden-
tical to those found in rule 56 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. Under the prior Illinois Act, summary judgments were
permitted in four types of actions: (1) upon a contract, express or
implied; (2) upon a judgment or decree for the payment of money;
(3) to recover the possession of land, with or without mesne profits;
and (4) to recover specific chattels.22 Today a summary judgment
may be entered in any action if the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Thus, in Allen v. Meyer,23 a summary decree was en-
tered awarding specific performance of an oral contract to convey
realty. On appeal, it was contended by the defendant that summary
judgment or decree was proper only where the issues involved were
simple. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, saying:
The statute has since been amended to provide for the entry of summary
judgment or decree in any proper case .... We regard this as a salutary de-
velopment. Summary judgment procedure is an important tool in the adminis-
tration of justice. Its use in a proper case, wherein is presented no genuine
issue as to any material fact, is to be encouraged. The benefits of summary
judgment in a proper case inure not only to the litigants, in the saving of time
and expenses, but to the community in avoiding congestion of trial calendars
and the expenses of unnecessary trials.
24
The Supreme Court also held that the trial court had properly con-
sidered discovery depositions in ruling on the motion.2"
2121 M.App.2d 227, 157 N.E.2d 799 (1959).
22 1l. Laws 1941, at 464. See Conrad v. Beaubien, 334 Ii. App. 198, 78 N.E.2d 846
(1948).
23 14 11.2d 284, 152 N.E.2d 576 (1958).
24 Id. at 292, 152 N.E.2d at 580.
25 But see Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill. App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306 (1960), where the
Appellate Court warned that it must be shown that the facts are unequivocally ad-
mitted in the discovery deposition to warrant the entry of a summary judgment.
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Jury demands. Two significant changes with respect to the filing
of jury demands were made in section 64 of the act. The first of these
changed the time for defendant to file a demand from the time of
filing his appearance to the time of filing his answer. Thus, it is no
longer necessary for defendant to file a jury demand when he files
a motion or a special appearance. 2 The second important change
concerns itself with the time within which a defendant must file a
demand for a jury trial, where the plaintiff has filed a jury demand
and subsequently withdraws it. Under the former practice, the de-
fendant had to file his demand "at the time of such waiver. '27 Under
new section 64, defendant must demand a jury "promptly after being
advised of the waiver ... " This provision gave rise to an interesting
case.
In Westmoreland v. West,21 plaintiff filed a demand for a jury trial.
Defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint.
When the case was called for trial, defendants failed to appear, where-
upon plaintiff waived a jury and the court entered judgment for
plaintiff. Subsequently, defendants petitioned to vacate the judgment
on the ground, inter alia, that under section 64(1) they were entitled
to be advised of plaintiff's waiver of a jury, and to be permitted an
opportunity to file their own demand, before the court could proceed
to trial without a jury. The trial court struck the petition to vacate,
and defendants appealed. The Appellate Court held that section 64(1)
required that the defendants be advised of the waiver, and that the
defendants. did not waive their right to a jury trial unless they were
so advised. 29
It should be noted that the rule applied in the Westmoreland case
obtains only when defendant has filed an answer and then does not
appear for trial. If a defendant fails to answer, the plaintiff need not
notify him of a withdrawal of his jury demand, for by failing to
answer, a defendant waives his right to demand a jury trial.3°
26 Note the provisions of § 59 of the Practice Act, and Supreme Court rule
8 as to extending the time of filing a jury demand. See Hudson v. Leverenz, 10 I11.2d 87,
139 N.E.2d 255 (1956) (dictum).
27 Ill. Laws 1947, at 1348.
28 19 111. App.2d 161, 153 N.E.2d 275 (1958).
29 Compare Till v. Kara, 22 Il. App.2d 502, 161 N.E.2d 363 (1959), in which de-
fendants apparently did not argue the Westmoreland concept.
a0 Lichter v. Scher, 11 111. App.2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66 (1956); Anzalone v. Johnson,
345 111. App. 410, 103 N.E.2d 383 (1952).
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PIECEMEAL APPEALS
Prior to the passage of the 1956 Act, any party against whom
judgment was rendered had a right of immediate appeal, even though
the cause remained undisposed of as to other parties.8 1 In suits brought
in equity for an accounting, a decree for an accounting referring the
cause to a master to take an account, and specifying the principles of
the accounting, was an appealable order.32 These rules have now been
changed. Section 50(2) of the 1956 Act provides: If multiple parties
or if multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, the court
may enter a final order, judgment, or decree as to one or more but
fewer than all of the parties or claims only upon an express finding
that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. In
the absence of that finding, any order, judgment, or decree which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not terminate the action, is not enforce-
able or appealable, and is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of an order, judgment, or decree adjudicating all the claims,
rights, and liabilities of all the parties. The section is patterned after
rule 54(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, and is designed
to prevent piecemeal appeals.
A considerable number of appeals have been dismissed since the
passage of the 1956 Act because the appellant failed to comply with
section 50(2). See, for example, Peterson v. GWin, 3 where the de-
fendant appealed from an order dismissing count II of his counter-
claim and denying him leave to file an amefided counterclaim. The
Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal, pointing out that
there were other claims for relief undisposed of in the trial court,
and that the order appealed from did not contain a finding that there
was no just reason for delaying appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the rule of the Altscbuler
case, mentioned above, has been superseded by section 50(2). In
Ariola v. Nigro,a4 the trial court had referred the causes to a master
to take an account, and had specified the principles of the accounting.
On plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that section
31 III. Laws 1953, at 507.
32 Altschuler v. Altschuler, 399 I1. 559, 78 N.E.2d 225 (1948).
33 17 l1l.2d 261, 161 N.E.2d 123 (1959).
34 13 III.2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
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50 (2) was applicable, "and that the present appeal must fail for plain-
tiffs' omission to obtain an express finding that there is no just reason
for delaying appeal until the matters reserved by the trial court have
been decided."35 In Smith v. Hodge,86 the court held that an order
quashing a writ of attachment in aid of an action to recover a money
judgment is not appealable without the express finding prescribed in
section 50(2). In Getzelman v. Koehler,17 a partition decree was held
neither final nor appealable where an account had not been taken
and the section 50(2) finding was not incorporated in the partition
decree. However, in Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Weinold,88 the Appel-
late Court held that a decree determining the validity of a trust and
the interest of the beneficiaries thereunder is appealable even though
the decree directs the trustee to file a supplemental account.
Despite the efforts of the Supreme Court to construe section 50(2)
in a way which will remove uncertainties for the practitioner as to
whether or not orders are appealable, complications have arisen. In
Oppenheimer Bros. v. Joyce & Co., 9 the First District Appellate
Court held that a final decree in a multiple party or claim case was
appealable even though the "appeal formula" of section 50(2) was
not included in the decree. The trial court had held that plaintiff
was not entitled to an accounting in equity, and had transferred the
case to the law side of the court. The decree taxed costs, including
master's fees, against the plaintiff, and ordered issuance of execution
for the costs. The plaintiff appealed from this decree, and the defend-
ants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decree adju-
dicated fewer than 'all the matters at issue and did not contain the
section 50(2) finding. The Appellate Court concluded that because
the decree ordered immediate execution, the trial court "must have
determined that this order was final and that there was no just reason
for delaying enforcement or appeal."40
Conversely, a decision of the Fourth District Appellate Court held
an order non-appealable even though it contained the "appeal for-
35 Id. at 207, 148 N.E.2d at 791. See also a companion case, Hanley v. Hanley, 13
I11.2d 209, 148 N.E.2d 792 (1958).
86 13 IU.2d 197, 148 N.E.2d 793 (1958).
37 14 111.2d 396, 152 N.E.2d 833 (1958).
38 22 11. App.2d 219, 160 N.E.2d 174 (1959).
39 17 111. App.2d 408, 150 N.E.2d 381 (1958).
40 Id. at 410, 150 N.E.2d at 382.
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mula" of section 50(2). In Veacb v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co.,4'
the complaint was cast in two counts, both Xeferring to the same
accident and injury. The defendant moved to strike both counts; the
trial court struck the second count, but permitted the first to stand,
and in its order inserted a finding that there was no just reason to
delay enforcement or appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed plaintiff's
appeal on the ground that the order was not final and appealable.
Presiding Justice Schenineman said:
* . .[W]hen only one claim is involved, although stated in several ways, a
ruling on pleadings which does not dispose of the single claim, is interlocutory,
and the trial court has no authority to confer appellate jurisdiction by a find-
ing that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.42
Perhaps the problem created by the Oppenheimer decision (that an
order may be held to be appealable even though it does not dispose
of all of the matters in the case and does not contain the "appeal
formula") is put to rest by the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Biagi v. O'Connor.48 There the court held that an order
entered before the effective date of the 1956 Civil Practice Act, al-
though appealable when entered, under the prior practice, could be
appealed currently upon the entry of a final decree, because section
74(1) of the act provides: "The appeal presents to the reviewing
court all issues which heretofore have been presented by appeal and
writ of error." The court reasoned that under the former practice,
a writ of error brought the whole record to the reviewing court, in-
cluding orders which were final and appealable when entered. Thus,
under Biagi, it may be that orders made final and appealable under
section 50(2) may be appealed either at the time of entry or at the
time the entire litigation is disposed of in the trial court.
DISCOVERY
Of all the reforms accomplished by the 1956 Act, those in the area
of discovery are among the most important. Prior to the new act, dep-
ositions were taken pursuant to the practice prescribed by the Evi-
dence and Depositions Act.44 Other types of discovery, such as the
examination of documents, were authorized by Supreme Court rules,
4122 I. App.2d 179, 159 N.E.2d 833 (1959).
42d. at 182-83, 159 N.E.2d at 835.
43 18 lll.2d 238, 163 N.E.2d 461 (1959).
44 111. Laws 1955, at 1998-2000.
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but were generally regarded as inadequate. Indeed the entire Illinois
system of discovery had been abundantly criticized.45
THE MECHANICS OF DISCOVERY
The mechanics, or methods by which discovery may be obtained,
have been greatly simplified. Under the old procedure, depositions
of parties and non-parties alike were taken by service of a notary
public subpoena. If the deponent failed to appear for deposition, or
upon appearing refused to answer the questions put to him, a separate,
ancillary proceeding was commenced, in the name of the notary
public to enforce his subpoena. Enforcement was limited to the threat
of contempt,4" a highly technical remedy, and the ever-present possi-
bility that the discoverer might not obtain the information he sought
in time for trial. Today, service of a deposition notice on a party is
sufficient to require the deposition appearance of the party; no sub-
poena is necessary. 7 As to non-parties, the clerk of the trial court
issues discovery subpoenaes on request which are served in the ordi-
nary manner on the deponent. And the court's sanctions can be in-
voked in the pending litigation.
Equally important are the comprehensive provisions of rule 19-12
relating to the consequences of refusal to comply with discovery. In
the event of a party's refusal, the trial court may, in addition to the
contempt sanction, strike the recalcitrant's pleadings, enter judgment
against him, bar him from maintaining his action, stay proceedings in
the pending litigation until the party complies, and impose economic
penalties in the form of costs and attorney's fees in favor of the party
seeking discovery. The most drastic of these sanctions-striking the
offending parties' pleadings and entering judgment against him-has
been exercised with approval. 8 Furthermore, the rule specifically
45 Fitzpatrick & Goff, Discovery and Depositions, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 630-32
(1955); Note, The Need for Revision of the Discovery Procedure in Illinois, 1949
U. ILL. L. F. 335.
46 Lorsbach v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 315 I1M. App. 32, 42 N.E.2d 338 (1942); Ross v.
Wells, 6 111. App.2d 304, 127 N.E.2d 519 (1955).
47 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 19-8, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-8 (1959). All Supreme Court
rules referred to herein will be found in chapter 110 of the 1959 ILLINoIs REVISED
STATUTEs under the appropriate rule number, prefixed by the common section num-
ber, 101, and a decimal point.
48 Coutrakon v. Distenfield, 21 111. App.2d 146, 157 N.E.2d 555 (1959) (defendant's
pleadings stricken); Sager Glove Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 18 Il. App.2d 568,
154 N.E.2d 833 (1958) (plaintiff's pleadings stricken).
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provides that its authorized sanctions come into play if a non-party
unreasonably refuses to comply with discovery at the instance of or
by collusion with a party.
Equally streamlined were the 1956 provisions relating to discovery
of documents 0 and the admission of facts and genuineness of docu-
ments.5 ° And in 1957, the Supreme Court adopted its rule 17-1 pre-
scribing the procedure to be followed for the physical and mental
examination of parties and other persons.
THE SUBJECTS OF DISCOVERY
But the mechanics of discovery were not the only subject of refor-
mation and innovation. During the past ten years the scope or subject
matter of discovery has been broadened greatly.
Names of witnesses. The discovery enabling section of the 1956
Act specifically provides that "a party shall not be required to furnish
the names or addresses of his witnesses."' On the other hand, Su-
preme Court rule 19-4 authorizes discovery of "the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." In Krupp
v. CTA 2 and Hruby v. CTA, 53 the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that discovery of the names of persons having knowledge of the event
was authorized by rule 19-4 and not prohibited by section 58(3).
The court narrowly construed the term "his witnesses" appearing in
section 58(3) to mean persons whom the party intended to call to
testify at the trial.5 4 In the Hruby case the court rejected an additional
argument that the names and addresses of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts were immune from discovery as a part of the "work
product" of the lawyer. The court noted particularly that names of
the persons had been gathered by a CTA conductor before any lawyer
had entered the case or any litigation was contemplated. Accordingly,
the names were not "work product," and disclosure of them did not
entail disclosure of "memoranda, reports or documents made by or
for a party in preparation for trial. ... "55
49 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 17.
50 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 18. 528 ll1.2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58(3) (1959). 53 11 Ill.2d 255, 142 N.E.2d 81 (1957).
54 Although decided subsequent to the adoption of the 1956 Practice Act, the facts
in the Krupp case arose prior to the adoption of the act and the promulgation of rule
19-4.
55 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 19-5.
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The question remains as to whether or not a party may call as a
witness at the trial a person whose name he has not disclosed in re-
sponse to discovery seeking the names of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts. However, it appears to be an issue addressed to the
trial court's sound discretion.50
Insurance coverage. While the existence or non-existence of insur-
ance coverage is irrelevant at trial, the Illinois Supreme Court held in
People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher 7 that it is the proper subject of dis-
covery, because "the presence or absence of liability insurance is fre-
quently the controlling factor in determining the manner in which a
case is prepared for trial."'58 In addition, the court was of the opinion
that discovery of this type afforded a plaintiff "a realistic appraisal of
his adversary and of the case he must prepare for, and affords a sounder
basis for the settlement of disputes."'5 9 The Terry decision clearly
indicates that rigid tests of materiality, relevancy, and admissibility
at trial are not proper criteria for discovery. Indeed, the Terry deci-
sion goes well beyond the generally accepted discovery test: "Is the
inquiry calculated to lead to material and relevant proof?"
Physical examination. In People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey,0° the
Supreme Court held that the Illinois courts have inherent power to
require a litigant who puts his physical condition in issue to submit
to a physical examination. As originally introduced in the legislature,
section 58(1) of the 1956 Practice Act provided that ". . . physical
or mental examination of parties shall be in accordance with rules."
However, this provision was deleted and the bill as adopted contained
no authority for court rules providing for physical and mental exam-
inations. Thus, the court's opinion in the Noren case would, on first
impression, appear contrary to the will of the legislature. However,
the court's rationale was that orders respecting physical examination
fall within the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate judicial
procedure. Following the Noren case, the court adopted rule 17-1,
regulating the procedure for physical examinations and the conditions
under which they should be ordered.
Privileged matters and protective orders. With a broadened scope
of discovery we find recurrence of questions concerning "privileged"
56 See Jay Bee Warehouse Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 883 (7th
Cir. 1959).
57 12 1l.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957). 59 Id. at 239, 145 N.E.2d at 593.
58 Id. at 238, 145 N.E.2d at 593. 60 10 11.2d 288, 139 N.E,2d 780 (1957).
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matters. Rule 19-5 regulates the subject. The biggest area of conten-
tion has been the so-called privilege against disclosure of counsel's
"work product" or documents made in preparation for trial. In McGill
v. Illinois Power Co.,6 1 the court held that the transcript of a discovery
deposition is not privileged work product, while in Kemeny v.
Skorch,62 the Appellate Court held that an "examining" physician's
report (as distinguished from a "treating" physician's report) is a
document made for a party in preparation for trial and not available
through discovery proceedings.
Of interest in this area is Haskell v. Siegmund,63 in which the Third
District Appellate Court held that statements contained in the de-
fendant's insurer's file were not privileged communications, were not
counsel's work product, and were not immune from disclosure at trial
as documents made in preparation for trial. While the Haskell case
did not involve pre-trial discovery, the decision suggests a departure
from other Appellate Court opinions holding such investigative doc-
uments immune from disclosure as having been made in preparation
for trial.64 The Supreme Court of Illinois has granted leave to appeal
in the Haskell case.65
Thus, in the past ten years, Illinois has made remarkable strides in
the area of discovery.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
The outrageous backlog in the trial of civil jury cases in Cook
County provoked an outstanding effort by the Illinois Supreme Court
to shorten the time consumed in the trial of such cases. The court's
effort in this regard was addressed to the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. Through the years these examinations had grad-
ually become extremely tedious and argumentative. Oftentimes they
consumed an inordinate portion of the total time devoted to the trial
of a particular case. Therefore, in 1958, the Supreme Court adopted
its rule 24-1 which provides that the trial court shall initiate and
conduct the voir dire examination of jurors in both civil and criminal
61 18 I11.2d 242, 163 N.E.2d 454 (1959).
62 22 Ill. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).
63 28 II. App.2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (1960).
64Hayes v. CTA, 340 IMI. App. 375, 92 N.E.2d 174 (1950); Chapman v. Gulf M. &
0. R.R., 337 Ill. App. 611, 86 N.E.2d 552 (1949).
65 Haskell v. Siegmund, No. 36356, Ill. Sup. Ct.
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cases, allowing the parties to supplement the examination, but forbid-
ding the examination of jurors concerning matters of law or instruc-
tions. In People v. Lobb,06 the court sustained the validity of the rule
over constitutional objections, holding that the scope and extent of
voir dire examination always rested within the discretion of the trial
court and was always subject to reasonable limitation. The history
of the rule in practice has demonstrated its wisdom. It has contributed
to the more expeditious trial of individual cases.
INSTRUCTING THE JURY
New provisions' were added to the Practice Act in 1956 relating
to the mechanics of requesting and settling instructions. Section 67 (3)
provides that the trial court "shall hold a conference with counsel to
settle the instructions. . . ." The reviewing courts have been strict in
requiring specific objections to be made to instructions, both at the
conference on instructions and in the post-trial motion. In Onderisin
v. Elgin, 1. & E. Ry., 7 the court said:
Enlightened trial practice does not permit counsel under the guise of trial
strategy to sit idly by and permit instructions to be given the jury without
specific objection and then be given the advantage of predicating error there-
on by urging the error for the first time in a post-trial motion.6 8
This year marks another milestone in Illinois practice and proce-
dure. Effective February 1, 1961, the Supreme Court of Illinois
adopted rule 25-1 relating to the use of standardized jury instructions
in civil cases, called "Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions." These in-
structions were prepared by a committee of attorneys appointed sev-
eral years ago by the Supreme Court. The product of their work has
been published in a bound volume, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONs. New rule 25-1 provides that whenever a pattern instruction
is applicable, "the IPI instructions shall be used, unless the court deter-
mines that it does not accurately state the law." If IPI does not contain
a pertinent instruction, "the instruction given on that subject should
be simple, brief, impartial and free from argument."
66 17 Ill.2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
07 20 111. App.2d 73, 155 N.E.2d 338 (1959).
68 Id. at 78, 155 N.E.2d at 341. See also Saunders v. Schultz, 20 lll.2d 301, 170 N.E.2d
163 (1960), affirming 22 Ill. App.2d 402, 161 N.E.2d 129 (1959).
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VERDICTS
Section 68 governs the procedure concerning the rendition of ver-
dicts and defective or unproved counts. Subsection (2) makes prompt
rendition of judgment on a verdict mandatory. Under former practice,
the trial court was permitted but not required to enter judgment
immediately upon return of a verdict.69 Subsection (2) of section 68,
by eliminating delay in the rendition of judgment, effected a desirable
change in the law, resulting in more uniformity in the time for filing
post-trial motions and appeals.
Section 68 (3) requires the trial court, on motion, to direct the jury
to find a separate verdict upon each demand where there are several
counts based on different demands upon which separate recoveries
might be had. Application of subsection (3) is illustrated in Madison
v. Wigal.70 There, the plaintiffs sought both compensatory and puni-
tive damages. The general verdict returned by the jury was in excess
of the amount of compensatory damages sought by one of the plain-
tiffs. The Appellate Court held that it was error for the trial court,
over defendant's objection, to submit a general form of verdict in
which punitive and compensatory damages were not segregated. Com-
pare the statement in the Joint Committee Comments to section 68 (3):
Separate verdicts are appropriate only when recovery on different demands
is sought in the same complaint. Therefore, the words "upon which separate
recoveries might be had" have been added, making clear that the provision
authorizing separate verdicts applies only to separate causes of action based
upon separate transactions. 71
As to subsection (4) of section 68, some cases decided under the
former Practice Act recognized no distinction between grounds de-
fectively pleaded as distinguished from pleaded grounds not proved.7 2
A different result was reached when the unproven count was a willful
and wanton count.73 The new subsection contains separate provisions
respecting the effect of defective grounds and the effect of unproved
grounds.
As to defective grounds, subsection (4) provides that a verdict will
not be set aside provided there is at least one ground which will sustain
69 Kauders v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 299 III. App. 152, 19 N.E.2d 630 (1939).
70 18 11. App.2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958).
71 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, S 68, at 545 (1956).
72 See, e.g., Scott v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 245 Ill. 460,92 N.E. 318 (1910).
73 Greene v. Noonan, 372 111.286, 23 N.E.2d 720 (1939).
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the verdict. As to unproved grounds, no verdict will be set aside for
the reason that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict on one
of the grounds unless a motion has been made to withdraw that ground
and there is a showing of prejudice.
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Section 68.1 of the Practice Act provides for motions for a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence and for motions after trial. It
established a simplified new procedure-a single post-trial motion-for
post-trial relief in jury cases, but made no substantial change in the
basic policy of the procedure established by the former Practice Act.
A party must seek all relief desired in the single post-trial motion,
which must be in writing.74
Subsection (6) requires the court to rule upon all relief sought. Even
though a ruling on a portion of the relief sought renders further rul-
ings unnecessary for the moment, the act requires the trial court to
enter conditional rulings on all post-trial motions presented. In making
these conditional rulings, the trial court must determine what it
would rule if its unconditional rulings were reversed. In Stilfield v.
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co.,7 it was held that the trial court com-
mitted error in granting judgment non obstante veredicto in its un-
conditional ruling, and committed an abuse of discretion in its condi-
tional award of a new trial. That case is an application of the last
sentence of subsection (6) which requires the reviewing court, if it
determines that the unconditional rulings are erroneous, to review and
determine the conditional rulings. This results in economy both for
parties and the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing is by no means a comprehensive study of the changes
the authors have witnessed in these areas of practice in the past ten
years. Indeed, each subject-parties, pleading, piecemeal appeals, dis-
covery, jury practice and instructions, and post-trial motions-is de-
serving of an individual article. But what has been written should
demonstrate that Illinois has not remained stagnant in these areas of
practice. It has moved ahead, maintaining its position as an enlightened
procedural state.
74 McKinney v. Cratty, 18 11. App.2d 561, 153 N.E.2d 113 (1958).
75 25 Ill. App.2d 428, 167 N.E.2d 295 (1960).
